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NOTES
EXPANDING FEDERAL INTERESTS AND
DIMINISHED PLAINTIFF RIGHTS: THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
The United States Supreme Court recently took another step
forward in its campaign to deny plaintiffs access to the federal
courts to recover for their injuries. In June, 1988, the United States
Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. affirmatively
recognized the "government contractor defense" already formu-
lated by some federal courts.' The government contractor defense
shields manufacturers of government-procured equipment from
liability for design defects in the equipment if the manufacturer can
satisfy the three-prong test set forth by the Boyle Court. The man-
ufacturer must show that the government approved reasonably
precise specifications for the equipment. The manufacturer must
also demonstrate that the equipment conformed to the government-
approved specifications. Finally, the manufacturer must show that
it warned the government of design dangers of which the manu-
facturer was aware but the government was not. 2
In Boyle, a helicopter copilot's father sued the aircraft's manu-
facturer tinder Virginia tort law for his son's wrongful death, basing
federal court jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship."' According to
the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in the landmark 1938
decision of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, in diversity actions a federal
court must apply the law of the state in which it sits, unless an
1 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988), vacating 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986) reh'g denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1182 (1980). justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Concurring with justice
Scalia were Chief justice Rehnquist and ju .stices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy. Justices
Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in dissent, justice Stevens filed a separate
dissenting opinion. The Fourth Circuit had previously recognized such a defense in Tozer
v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 404 (4th Cir. 1986), ceri, denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
2 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
5 Id, at. 2513.
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overriding federal concern displaces state law. 4
 In the fifty years
since the Erie decision, the Court has recognized only a few subject
areas—those of "uniquely federal interest"—sufficient to oust state
law. 5
 The Supreme Court considers an area one of uniquely federal
interest if the Constitution and laws of the United States in some
way grant the federal government control of the areas In post-Erie
cases, the Court identified as uniquely federal interests such areas
as international relations, the rights and duties of the United States
under its contracts, relations between the government and military
personnel, government officials' immunity, admiralty law, and in-
terstate conflicts.'
Because the Boyle controversy did not directly implicate any of
these traditional areas of federal interest, the Court had to show
that the displacement of Virginia law by federal common law was a
legitimate exercise of its authority. 8
 The Court did so by extending
its traditional view of the concept of a uniquely federal interest.
The Boyle Court reasoned that the government's interest in getting
its work done qualified as a uniquely federal interest because that
interest impinged upon two traditionally-recognized interests—the
United States' contractual rights and government officials' immu-
nity." The Boyle controversy implicated the government's interest in
Eric R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The Federal Judiciary Act of
September 24, 1789, provides that "the laws of the several states where applicable shall be
applied in federal court trials, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise provide." Federal Judiciary Act, ch. 34, 1 Stat. 72, 92 (1789). The
Supreme Court in the 1842 decision of Swift v. Tyson interpreted the Federal Judiciary Act
as not requiring federal courts to apply the unwritten common law of the states. 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 166, 170 (1842). Erie overruled Swift and held that the term "laws of the several states"
included common law. 304 U.S. at 77,78.
5 Cf. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM.
L. REV, 1024, 1030-31 (1967).
6 See Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514-15.
7 See Hill, supra note 5, at 1031-49 (citing Hinderlider v. LaPlata River Co., 304 U.S.
92, 110 (1938) (federal common law regarding use of interstate streams applicable to state
court actions); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917) (founding fathers
intended that a uniform maritime law should prevail in federal court); Pope & Talbort, Inc.
v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-11 (1953) (same, in state court); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (rights of United States with respect to its commercial paper
governed by federal law); United States v. Standard Oil of Cal., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (rela-
tionship between United States and members of armed forces governed by federal law); Barr
v. Matted, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (federal law governs United States' officials' immunity);
Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (same); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964) (federal common law applies to questions of international relations).
8 See Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513-14.
9 	at 2514.
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getting its work done, the Court concluded, because it involved the
design and procurement of government equipment.
Although the Boyle Court settled the question of whether courts
will recognize a government contractor defense, several issues re-
main unresolved. The Court did not define the terms "approval"
of a design and "reasonably precise specifications." Rather, the
Court left interpretation of these terms for later courts. In addition
to its failure to define key terms, Boyle might also hamper the
government's efficient functioning by encouraging contractors to
insist on high levels of government involvement in equipment de-
sign.
This note discusses the foundations of Boyle and its implications
for the future. Section 1 outlines Supreme Court jurisprudence that
has developed since *Erie concerning uniquely federal interests.'"
Section II examines Boyle, the case in which the Supreme Court
recognized a new uniquely federal interest—that of getting the
government's work done." Section III suggests that the Boyle Court
possessed the authority to fashion federal common law, but for
reasons in addition to those set Forth by the majority.' 2 Section III
also suggests, however, that in the exercise of its common lawmaking
power the Boyle Court should have refused to recognize the gov-
ernment contractor defense and instead should have relegated its
creation to Congress." Finally, Section III predicts the government
contractor defense's future development through analysis of lower
court cases that have been decided since Boyle.'''
I. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF A UNIQUELY FEDERAL INTEREST
Although Justice Brandeis proclaimed in Erie that "[[]here is
no federal gerieral common law,"' 5 the idea that the federal courts
1 " See infra notes 21-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of post-Erie cases in
which the Supreme Court recognized a uniquely federal interest sufficient to displace state
law.
11 Sec infra notes 68-155 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the government
contractor defense's historical development and a discussion of Boyle v. United Technologies.
12 See infra notes 201-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of additional theories
upon which the Boyle Court might have based its authority to fashion federal common law.
IS See infra notes 214-21) and accompanying text for a discussion of reasons why the
Boyle Court should have deferred to Congress for creation of the defense.
I1
	 infra notes 221-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government
contractor defense's future and for an analysis of post -Boyle cases. See also infra notes 156-
200 for a summary of post -Boyle cases.
15
 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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should fashion law in certain areas has survived.' 6 In some instances,
the Constitution expressly grants federal control of an area." Fed-
eral legislation enacted under Congress's constitutional power also
mandates federal control in some circumstances.' 8 In other in-
stances, the federal courts' lawmaking power derives from the no-
tion that a federal interest• is involved, rather than from an express
mandate.' 9
 Where federal interests are implicated, only the displace-
ment of state law and the application of federal law can insure that
courts will fully consider federal interests in the adjudication pro-
cess.2"
On the same day that Erie was decided in 1938, the United
States Supreme Court first recognized a federal interest sufficient
to override state law in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co. 2 i The Court held that the apportionment of an interstate
stream's waters could be determined only under federal common
law. 22 In Hinderlider, a ditch company sued to invalidate the actions
of Colorado's state engineer under a water-sharing compact be-
tween Colorado and New Mexico. 23 The ditch company argued that
Colorado's state engineer, Hinderlider, by following the water-shar-
ing scheme, had deprived' the company of water that it had a right
under state law to divert. 24
"1 Hill, supra note 5, at 1026.
17 Id. at 1030-34. For example, the Constitution grants the federal judiciary original
jurisdiction over controversies to which a state is a party. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I. The
same section extends federal judicial power to admiralty cases.
15 Hill, supra note 5, at 1028-30. An example of a case in which the Court found a
congressional mandate fur courts to formulate federal law was Textile Workers' Union of
America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957).
19 See Hill, supra note 5, at 1035.
'" Cf. Texas Indus., Inc, v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). This is
not to say that the government will always win. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text
for a discussion of a case in which the Court denied the United States recovery after
consideration of federal interests. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301,
3 l4 (1947).
21 304 U.S. 92 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 668 (1938). The Supreme Court decided
Erie and Hinderlider on the same day, April 25, 1938. justice Brandeis delivered both opinions.
22 Id. at 110.
25 Id. at 98-99.
25 Id. The water-sharing agreement provided that each state would have unrestricted
use of the water for the two-and-one-half month period between December 1 and February
15 of each following year. At all other times, each state had unrestricted access to the water
on each day that the mean flow at the interstate station was at least 100 cubic feet per second.
On days when the mean flow fell short of that mark, Colorado was required to deliver one-
half of the mean flow at the Hesperus Station for the previous day. At times of low flow,
state engineers had the discretion to allow use of all the water by one state at a time, on an
alternating basis. Id. at 96-97.
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In Hinderlider, the Supreme Court noted that it had long con-
sidered the resolution of interstate boundary disputes to be a legit-
imate federal interest. 25 The Court concluded that the apportion-
ment of interstate streams likewise presented federal questions. The
apportionment of an interstate stream, the Court reasoned, was a
matter of federal common law, even where the litigants were private
parties. 26 The case before it, the Hinderlider Court observed, impli-
cated the federal interest in settling interstate disputes even though
neither Colorado nor New Mexico could be made parties to the
action. Thus, by categorizing the apportionment of an interstate
stream as an interstate boundary dispute, the Court was able to
resolve the dispute under federal common law.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that some commercial
transactions implicate federal interests. In D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., decided in 1942, the Supreme Court
fashioned federal common law to further the federal interest of
protecting federal corporations and held that a bank's liability to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation involved a federal ques-
tion. 27 In D'Oench, the FDIC acquired an allegedly worthless note
as collateral for a loan that it issued. 28 When the FDIC sued in
federal district court to collect on the note, the court found the
maker liable under Illinois law. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision. 29
The Supreme Court in D'Oench reversed, deciding that state
law should not apply because certain provisions of the Federal
Reserve Act revealed Congress's policy to protect the FDIC and the
public funds entrusted to it." The Court reasoned that it should
give force to the policy evinced by the Federal Reserve Act even
though, technically, the statute was inapplicable. 3 ' The statute was
inapplicable to the facts in D'Oench, the Court noted, because the
maker issued the note in 1933, one year before the government
created the FDIC. Therefore, reasoned the Court, the maker of the
note and the bank could not have acted with the intent necessary
to deceive the FDIC and violate the statute. Yet, the D'Oench Court
25 Id. at 110.
26 Id. at 110-11.
2.5 315 U.S. 447,456-59 (1942), rev'g 117 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1941), reh'g denied, 315 U.S.
830 (1942).
25 Id. at 456.
26 117 F.2d 491 (8111 Cir. 1941), cert. granted, 314 U.S. 592 (1941).
50 315 U.S. at 456-57.
51 See id. at 459.
342	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 IVol. 31:337
believed that because the defendant had violated the statute's un-
derlying policy, the controversy implicated a federal interest suffi-
cient to preempt state law." Thus, the D'Oench Court established
that commercial transactions affecting federal corporations are fed-
eral in nature.
The Supreme Court also addressed uniquely federal interests
in the realm of commercial transactions in the 1943 case of Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States." The Clearfield Court held that federal law
governs the rights and duties of the United States on its commercial
paper. 34
 In that case, an unauthorized individual obtained a pay-
check issued to a Works Project Administration (WPA) employee
and fraudulently cashed it at a J.C. Penney store. The store turned
the check over to its bank, Clearfield Trust, and the bank collected
the funds from the United States treasury. 35
 When the government
discovered the forgery, it attempted to obtain, reimbursement from
Clearfield Trust. 3" When the bank refused, the United States
brought suit in federal district court. Applying Pennsylvania law,
the district court held that the bank need not return the funds,
because the government had not notified the bank in a timely
fashion that a possible forgery was involved."
Although the federal .district court applied Pennsylvania law,
consistent with Erie, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the Erie doctrine did not apply
under the circumstances in Clearfield because federal court jurisdic-
tion was not based on diversity." The Supreme Court affirmed,
reasoning that federal law had to prevail in cases that affected the
rights and duties of' the United States' commercial paper. The Court
noted that the Constitution confers upon the federal government
the power to disburse funds and to pay debts. The Clearfield Court
reasoned that because the authority to issue the check derived from
the Constitution and from a federal statute, the substantive rules
concerning the check must also be federal. Because there was no
statute on point, the Court stated, the federal courts must fashion
the rule of law." According to the Clearfield Court, the application
32 See id. at 456.
" 318 U.S. 363 (1943), aff'g 130 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1942).
4 Id. at 366.
35 Id. at 364-65.
36
 Id. at 365.
37 Id. at 366.
38 130 F.2d 93, 94 (3d Cir. 1942).
34 Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367.
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of state law in cases involving checks drawn on the United States
treasury could result in different state laws governing identical
transactions, depending upon the state in which the transaction
happened to occur. Therefore, the Court decided, a uniform rule
was necessary.
The Clearfield Court formulated a uniform rule that would
allow the United States to recover the funds From Clearfield Trust.`"'
The United States had failed to give Clearfield Trust prompt notice
of the forgery, and so the doctrine of !aches applied to the United
States as it would to any other drawee.'" The United States govern-
ment, the Court observed, "does business on business terms."'
Nevertheless, the Court stated that the United States would be
precluded From recovery only if its delay in notifying Clearfield
Trust of the forgery had damaged Clearfield Trust." In this way,
the Clearfield Court extended the rule of D'Oench that commercial
transactions affecting federal agencies implicate federal interests.
Another area of Federal interest that the Supreme Court has
recognized is the United States' rights and duties with respect to its
employees. In the 1959 decision of Howard v. Lyons, the Supreme
Court addressed the federal interest of immunity for government
officials acting within the scope of their duty.'" The Supreme Court
held that only federal law could determine the extent of the privi-
lege for government employees acting within the scope of their
authority." In Howard, the Boston Navy Shipyard's commanding
officer wrote a letter to the Massachusetts congressional delegation,
informing it that he was withdrawing his support from the union
representing workers at the shipyard. 46
 The letter contained al-
legedly defamatory statements. The Howard Court stated that the
question of whether the commanding officer was immune from suit
involved a federal question because federal officers' authority to act
derives from federal sources. 47 In addition, the Howard Court con-
cluded, the purpose of the immunity privilege is to promote the
effective functioning of the federal government by insuring that
4" See id. at 370.
41 Id. at 369.
" Id. (quoting United States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527,
534 (1925)).
49
	 at 370.
" 360 'U.S. 593, 597 (1959), mfg.
 Lyons v. Howard, 250 F.2d 912 (1958), rehg denied.
361 U.S. 854 (1959).
45 Id. at 597.
4° 1d. at 594.
47 Id. at 597.
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the threat of liability does not influence officials' actions. The Court
observed that the promotion of the federal government's effective
functioning was obviously a matter of federal concern.
As Hinderlider, D'Oench, Clearfield, and Howard illustrate, the
courts typically apply federal law when a controversy implicates a
federal interest. The cases illustrate that the Court is likely to find
that a federal interest is implicated when the result will affect some
government agency or employee. Absent an applicable statute or
controlling precedent, the court must formulate the rule of deci-
sion. 48
 Sometimes a court may exercise judicial restraint in creating
its own rule, thereby relegating to Congress the duty of creating
new remedies, novel causes of action, or ground-breaking de-
fenses.`'`'
An example of the Supreme Court declining to create federal
common law is the 1947 case of United .States v. Standard Oil Co. of
California. In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court held that the United
States has no cause of action against tortfeasors who cause injury
to military personnel, and that only Congress should create such a
novel cause of action." In Standard Oil, a truck owned by Standard
Oil of California and operated by one of its employees struck and
injured a soldier. The government paid for the soldier's hospitali-
zation and continued to pay his salary throughout the term of his
disability.•" The government sued Standard Oil for the expenses it
incurred and for the loss of the soldier's services during the dis-
ability period. In its petition to the Supreme Court, the government
claimed that it had received more than 450 reports of negligent
injuries to service personnel over a three-year period, and that it.
continued to receive approximately forty reports every month. The
government claimed that this particular suit was representative of
many others.
In deciding to apply federal law in Standard Oil, the Supreme
Court relied on the Clearfield reasoning. 52 In the same way that the
authority to issue commercial paper has a federal source, the Court
noted, the scope and nature of the relationship between the gov-
ernment and persons in the armed services derives from federal
48 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367.
49 Hill, supra note 5, at 1039.
s) 332 U.S. 301, 314 (1947), aff'g Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 153 F.2d
958 (9th Cir. 1946).
SL Id. at 302. Total cost to the government of the soldier's hospitalization was $123.45.
His pay was $69.31 per month.
52 hi. at 305.
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sources." Because the United States has the power to establish a
relationship with persons in the armed forces and to define that
relationship, the Court concluded that the United States also has
the power to protect the relationship from harm by third parties.
In addition to the government's interest in protecting its rela-
tionship with armed forces personnel, the government's interest in
protecting its treasury also was involved in Standard Oil. The gov-
ernment argued that the cumulative effect of the hundreds of
separate acts of tortious conduct against service personnel was det-
rimental to the government's fiscal operations. Thus, the Standard
Oil Court stated, the government's power to protect its own fiscal
welfare adds weight to the argument for preempting state law. 54
The Court stated that the preemption of state law in Standard
Oil did not offend the Erie doctrine." Erie's purpose, said the Stan-
dard Oil Court, was not to broaden state power over matters federal
in character, nor to broaden the state power for determining which
matters are federal. Rather, the Court observed, Erie's purpose was
to bring federal judicial power under state law subjection when
federal courts adjudicate matters of local interest and concern. 56
The Court reasoned that consistency and certainty would suffer
were state law to control in Standard Oil, because the government's
indemnification rights would vary depending upon the state in
which a soldier was injured. 57 The Court noted that the potential
for uncertainty increased because armed forces personnel move
often.
In spite of its conclusion that Standard Oil implicated a legiti-
mate federal interest, the Court refused to create the indemnity
sought by the government and elected to leave the matter to Con-
gress.'" The Court noted that Congress had acted previously to
protect the government's fiscal interests when necessary and would
possibly do so in the future.`'`' The judiciary would intrude upon a
congressional prerogative, the Standard Oil Court reasoned, if the
courts, rather than the legislature, created the indemnification. The
Supreme Court has evinced this same deference to congressional
authority in more recent cases.
Id. at 305-06.
" 332 U.S. at 306.
55 14. at 307.
5r,
57 Id. at 310,
r'" Id. at 314.
5" Id. at 315-16.
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In the 1981 decision of Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that a controversy may not be subject
to federal judicial lawmaking even though it implicates a federal
interest. 60 In Texas Industries, a purchaser of concrete sued the pe-
titioner, Texas Industries, for damages arising from alleged viola-
tions of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 6 ' The petitioner filed a third-
party complaint seeking contribution against respondent. 62 The dis-
trict court dismissed the third-party complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted because federal statutory
law contained no provision allowing antitrust defendants to receive
contribution from co-conspirators. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that the
issue of whether contribution should be allowed was a matter of
federal common law. After examination of the merits, the Fifth
Circuit decided not to create the right of contribution.°
On review, the Supreme Court observed that the legislative
history of neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act indicates
that Congress intended a right of contribution. 64 Therefore, the
Texas Industries Court concluded that it could create such a right
only out of its power to make federal common law. In this case,
however, the Court took a narrow view of its own authority to make
law, asserting that such power exists only in limited areas. 65 The
Court noted that the case's outcome was indirectly related to federal
interests, because any decisions in the area of antitrust necessarily
would supplement the federal statutory scheme. 66 Nevertheless, the
Court stated, the right of contribution does not directly affect any
matters "necessarily subject to federal control." Thus, the Texas
Industries Court held, absent Congressional direction, it lacked the
power to create the right of contribution."' The Court was reluctant
to overstep its bounds and stated that only Congress has the au-
thority to create such a right.
6" 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981).
" 1 Id. at 632.
"2 451 U.S. at 633. The plaintiff in the original antitrust suit believed that respondent
was one of petitioner's co-conspirators.
'' Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897,900 (1979).
6' Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 639-40.
6, Id. at 641. According to the Texas Industries Court, these areas include issues involving
the rights and obligations of the federal government under its contracts, interstate and
international disputes, and admiralty cases. Id.
66 Id. at 642.
"7 Id. at 646.
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As the cases indicate, the Supreme Court will fashion and apply
federal common law to protect the government's interests when the
government is dealing in the commercial marketplace. In other
areas where Congress has already exercised its power, however, or
where fashioning federal common law would intrude upon Con-
gress's power, the Supreme Court is less likely to engage in judicial
activism. The notion of government contractor immunity can be
viewed as fitting into both categories of cases at the same time. On
one hand, when the government purchases military equipment, it
ventures into the commercial marketplace and may require the
protection of federal common law. On the other hand, the outfitting
of the Army is generally considered within the realm of Congress's
discretion.
II. CREATION OF A NEW UNIQUELY FEDERAL INTEREST:•THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. Pre-Boyle Decisions
The government contractor defense recently adopted by the
Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. shields manu-
facturers of government-procured equipment from liability for de-
sign defects in the equipment if the manufacturer can satisfy a
three-prong test." The manufacturer must show that the govern-
ment approved reasonably precise specifications for the equipment,
that the equipment conformed to the specifications, and that it
warned the government of design dangers known to the manufac-
turer but not to the government."
This common-law defense for government contractors has
evolved slowly since Erie." The first contractor defense cases in-
volved construction contractors working under direct government
supervision. 7 ' Cases then arose involving the liability of manufac-
turers for design defects in products made for use by the military
68 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988).
TO For a more complete history of the defense, see Turner & Sutin, The Government
Contractor Defense: When are Manufacturers of Military Equipment Shielded from Liability for Design
Defects?, 52 J. AIR L. & Cont. 397, 399-420 (1986); Note, The Government Contract Defense in
Product Liability Suits; Lethal Weapon for Non-Military Government Contractors, 37 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1131,1133-45 (1987); Note, Government Contract Defense: Sharing the Protective Cloak of
Sovereign Immunity After McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 181, 193-
98 (1985).
See, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
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during wartime.72 Later, cases came before the federal courts in-
volving alleged negligent design of military aircraft."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recognized the government contractor defense in the 1983 decision
of McKay v. Rockwell International Corp. 74 In McKay, the court held
that an aircraft manufacturer is not strictly liable for design defects
where the government itself is immune from suit" under the doc-
trines of Feres v. United Statesm and Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States." The Feres doctrine states that the federal government
is not liable to service personnel under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries sustained in the course of military service. 78 Under the
Stencel doctrine, the United States is not required to indemnify a
third party for damages paid to a member of the military. 79
In addition to holding that federal immunity is a prerequisite
to defense contractor immunity, the Ninth Circuit in McKay held
that the defense contractor must show that the equipment con-
formed to reasonably precise specifications that the government had
established or approved. 8° The government contractor must also
show that it warned the government about patent errors in the
specifications or dangers in the use of the equipment of which the
manufacturer was aware but the government was not.
In Tozer v. LTV Corp., a 1986 case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit's opinion
in McKay, holding that the government contractor defense shielded
an aircraft's manufacturer from both negligent and strict liability.si
In recognizing the government contractor defense, the Tozer court
considered separation of powers to be important. 82 The Fourth
Circuit observed that the judicial branch of the government, lacking
the power to declare war or to administer the armed forces, is the
" See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
75 See, e.g., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
74
 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
75 Id. at 451.
76 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
77 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
78 Peres, 340 U.S. at 146.
72 Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673-74.
" 704 F.2d at 451.
81 792 F.2d 403,408-09 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
82 792 F.2d at 405. For a more detailed discussion of the policy reasons behind the
defense, see Note, The Government Contract Defense: Is Sovereign Immunity a Necessary Prerequi-
site?, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 495,499-506 (1986).
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least involved in military affairs of the three government branches.
The Tozer court also pointed out that the judicial branch lacks the
military expertise' that the other branches possess by virtue of their
dedicated departments and committees. Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the judiciary was ill-equipped to question military decisions
and should defer to the other government branches. 83
B. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
The Supreme Court first addressed the government contractor
defense issue in the 1988 case of Boyle v. United Technologies. 84 The
Boyle Court held that government, contractors are immune from
product liability where the government approved reasonably precise
specifications to which the allegedly defective equipment con-
formed, and where the equipment manufacturer warned the gov-
ernment of dangers known to the manufacturer but not to the
government. 85 In Boyle, the father of Marine helicopter copilot
David A. Boyle brought a diversity action against the Sikorsky Di-
vision of United Technologies for his son's wrongful death.'" David
Boyle died on April 27, 1983, when the helicopter in which he was
flying crashed into the ocean off Virginia Beach, Virginia. Boyle
survived the crash, but was unable to operate the escape hatch and
was drowned.
At trial, the plaintiff presented two tort theories of recovery
based on Virginia law. 87 The first theory alleged that Sikorsky had
defectively repaired the helicopter's servo, 88 resulting in a malfunc-
tion that caused the crash. 8" The plaintiff also alleged that Sikorsky
defectively designed the helicopter's escape hatch such that it
opened outward and could not be opened against the water pres-
sure on the submerged craft. In addition, the plaintiff contended
that other equipment obstructed the escape hatch handle.9° The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the jury decision and remanded with directions to
" Tozer, 792 F.2d at 405-06.
84 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
85 Id. at 2518.
ar ld. at 2513.
"1 Id.
" 6 The servo is part of the helicopter's automatic flight control system.
,9 Id.
'' Id.
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enter a judgment for Sikorsky. 91 The Fourth Circuit ruled, as a
matter of Virginia law, that the plaintiff failed to Meet the burden
of proving that Sikorsky's repair work caused the malfunction. 92
The court also concluded that as a matter of federal law Sikorsky
was not liable for design defects." In so finding, the court relied
on the elements of the "military contractor defense" that it had
recognized earlier that day in Tozer. 94
Boyle's father petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the
court of appeals decision on three grounds. 95 He asserted that there
was no justification in federal law for granting government con-
tractors immunity from suits based on design defects. Even if the
defense did exist, he argued, the Fourth Circuit's articulation of its
elements was inappropriate. Finally, Boyle's father contended that
the court of appeals should have remanded the case for determi-
nation of whether the defendant had satisfied the defense's ele-
ments.
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, several third par-
ties interested in the controversy's outcome filed amicus curiae briefs
with the Court. 96
 The United States, in its amicus curiae brief sup-
porting affirmance of the Fourth Circuit's decision, urged the Court
to recognize the government contractor defense. 97
 The government
claimed that, without immunity, military contractors would be re-
luctant to participate in designing equipment, thus depriving the
government of its contractors' expertise.98 The government also
argued that, without immunity, contractors would carry the entire
burden of judgments in military equipment design defect cases,
91 Id.
92 Id. The appellate decision is reported at 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986).
95 Id.
9-4 Id. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Tozer.
95 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513.
"6 The following is a partial list of parties filing amicus curiae briefs in the case: Joan S.
Tozer (plaintiff in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. CL
2897 (1988)); Edwin Lees Shaw (party in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736
(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988)); Bell Helicopter; UNR Industries, Inc.
The following corporations joined with several manufacturing associations in filing a joint
brief on behalf of respondent: The Boeing Company, Eaton Corp., Emerson Electric Co.,
FMC Corp., The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Hughes Aircraft Co., IBM Corp., ITT
Defense Technology Corp., Litton Industries, Inc., Martin Marietta Corp., McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., Motorola, Inc., Oshkosh Truck Corp., Raytheon Co., Rockwell International Corp.,
The Singer Co., Texas Instruments, Inc., and Unisys Corp.
97
 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 13, Boyle v. United
Technologies, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988) (No. 86-492).
9' Id,
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because the government is generally immune from suit in such
cases.°9
An amicus curiae brief filed on petitioner's behalf stressed that
in 1984 the government had urged Congress not to create the
defense."'" Testifying before a congressional subcommittee, a de-
fense department representative stated that the government desired
contractor liability because it promoted safety.'°' The government
representative asserted that the government preferred to contract
for goods in a commercial-type marketplace where suppliers protect
themselves from liability by obtaining insurance.'° 2 This brief sug-
gested that the government's change of position on the contractor
liability issue in Boyle represented an attempt to relieve defense-
industry pressure on Congress to grant contractor immunity." The
Court addressed the arguments before it,. beginning with the peti-
tioner's contention that the federal judiciary lacked the power to
create the defense.
1. The Court's Authority to Create the Defense
Prior to Boyle, some federal court decisions that recognized the
government contractor defense, most notably Tozer v. LTV Corp. and
McKay v. Rockwell international Corp., arose in the context of mari-
time statutory law." Thus, jurisdiction was not based on diversity,
and the courts did not have to contend with the Erie doctrine." In
Boyle, however, federal court jurisdiction was based on diversity,'""
and so the Court was forced to confront Erie.
99 Id. at 13-14.
Ri° Brief for Edwin Lees Shaw as Annals Curiae on Behalf of Petitioner at 27-29, Boyle
v, United Technologies, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988) (No. 86-492).
I" Id. (citing Hearings on HR 4083 and HR 4199 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Law and Government Relations of the Committee on the ptiently, 09th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1984)).
I" Brief for Edwin Lees•Shaw as Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Petitioner at 27-29, Boyle
v. United Technologies, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988) (No. 86-492).
'° Id. at 28-29.
I" McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 704 F.2d 444,446-47 (9th Cir. 1983); Tozer v. LTV
Corp., 792 F.2d 403,404 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988). Federal court
jurisdiction in both cases was based on the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-
767 (1982).
1 {15 Even if the plaintiff's in Tozer and McKay had brought their claims under general
maritime theories, the federal courts likely would have applied federal common law. The
Constitution extends federal court jurisdiction to admiralty matters. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that admiralty cases require
a uniform rule. Hill, supra note 5, at 1032. It is now well settled that federal common law
applies in most admiralty cases.
wu Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513. •
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• Boyle's first assignment of error was that because no legislation
shielded government contractors from liability, there was no basis
for judicial recognition of the defense. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument, noting that the controversy involved a "uniquely
federal interest." 107 Uniquely' federal interests, stated the Court, are
those that the Constitution and laws of the United States so commit
to federal control that state law is preempted, even where Erie would
otherwise apply)"
The Court declared that the controversy in Boyle bordered on
two areas that the Court had called uniquely federal interests.' 09
The first area, the Court noted, was the United States' rights and
duties under its contracts. 110 The Court observed that, although
Boyle did not involve the United States' rights or obligations under
any contract, the manufacturer's liability arose out of the perfor-
mance of a contract with the United States."' According to the Boyle
Court, such liability was so closely related to the contract that, until
1962, Virginia allowed only purchasers of products and those in
privity with the seller to bring design defect suits.
The second area of uniquely federal interest upon which Boyle
impinged was the liability of federal officials for actions taken in
the line of duty. 112 The Court observed that, although Boyle involved
the performance of a government contract by a private party rather
than the official action of a government official, the two situations
were analogous."" Both situations, the Court stated, "obviously im-
plicated the same interest , in getting the government's work
done."" 4 The Boyle Court then extended to procurement contrac-
tors what it viewed as the same immunity already granted to per-
formance contractors."' The Court reasoned that contractors ful-
I 07 Id.
100 Id. at 2514.
109
", Id. (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., inc., 412 U.S. 580, 590-94
(1973); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); National Metro. Bank
v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1993)).
111 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
112 Id. (citing Wcstfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593,
597 (1959); Barr v. Matte°, 360 U.S. 564, 569-74 (1959); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d
Cir. 1926), aff 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curium); Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 463 (1896);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872)).
113 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2514-15 (citing Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940)). In
Yearsley, the Court held that if the Constitution grants Congress the authority to carry out
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filling government procurement contracts could not be liable as long
as the Constitution conferred authority upon the government to
make the contract and to obtain the equipment.""
In dissent, Justice Brennan sharply criticized the Court for
offending the notions of federalism set forth in Erie. "7 Prior to Erie,
Justice Brennan noted, federal courts were generally free to estab-
lish rules of federal common law when sitting in diversity, unless a
state statute otherwise controlled." 8 Justice Brennan observed that
Erie sharply limited this power of the federal courts by requiring
them to apply state law except in matters that the Constitution or
congressional acts governed. According to Justice Brennan, the Erie
Court branded federal common lawmaking an unconstitutional in-
vasion of states' authority." 9 Thus, concluded justice Brennan, the
Court should exercise restraint and proclaim federal common law
only in such special, recognized instances as admiralty, interstate
and international conflicts, and disputes concerning the United
States' contractual rights and duties.
Justice Brennan noted that because the electorate, through its
representatives, usually decides whether to displace state law, the
decision is not one for the courts. 12" justice Brennan observed that
Congress had not granted immunity to contractors at the time Boyle
was decided. 12 ' In fact, he noted, Congress had defeated several
bills on the subject in the decade prior to Boyle. 122 Therefore, Justice
Brennan concluded, the Court had overstepped its authority in
creating the defense.
The dissent also noted that the majority did not pretend that
the newly-proclaimed government contractor defense fit within any
of the handful of uniquely federal interests already recognized.'"
The dissent considered the mere fact that the majority was able to
list some federal interests — which Justice Brennan called
"inapplicable" — insufficient support for the conclusion that gov-
ernment contractors' liability was also an important federal interest
the project, then the contractor performing the work could not be liable for exercising
Congress's will. 309 U.S. at 20-21.
116 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515-16.
Id. at 2520-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 ' Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110 Id,
120 Id.
121 Id. at 2519-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122 Id, at 2519-20 & n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 108 S. Ct. at 2521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that the Court must protect. 124 Justice Brennan viewed the interests
implicated in Boyle as collateral to the government contract, not
intimately tied up in it. 125 'According to the dissent, the fact that the
government might be forced to pay a premium for designs that
exposed the manufacturer to liability was insufficient cause for the
Court to intervene: the government's interest in the outcome of the
dispute was "too speculative and remote" to displace state law.' 2°
2. The Court's Justification for the Creation of the Defense
The Boyle Court noted that the classification of an area as one
of "uniquely federal interest" was a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for the preemption of state law. 127
 According to the Court,
for preemption to occur, a "significant conflict" must exist between
a federal policy or interest and the application of state law.' 28 Al-
ternatively, stated the Court, courts may preempt state law where
its application would "frustrate specific objectives" of the federal
legislation.
The Boyle Court noted that the Fourth Circuit in Tozer had
attempted to define sittqtions in which a significant conflict with
federal interests would exist.' 2° The Fourth Circuit, observed the
Boyle Court, looked to the Feres doctrine for guidance.' 3° The Court
noted that the Fourth Circuit saw a conflict between adopting Feres,
which states that the federal government is not liable to military
personnel for injuries sustained in the course of service, and con-
tinuing the common law !policy of military contractor liability. Ac-
cording to the Fourth Circuit, the Boyle Court observed, the purpose
of Feres was to protect the government's pocketbook. 13 ' The Fourth
Circuit, noted the Boyle Court, reasoned that military contractors
who incurred liability for-defective designs would pass the liability
costs on to the government, thus increasing the cost of government
procurement.
124 Id. at 2521-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Yazell Y. United Slates, 382 U.S. 341,
352 (1966)).
125 Id. at 2523 (Brennan,,., dissenting).
' 16 Id. (quoting Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1977) (quoting Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956))).
,27 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515.
128 Id.
129 id. at 2517 (citing Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986)).
15" Id. at 2517. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Peres doctrine.
See Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517.
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The Boyle Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Tozer
because it produced results that were both too broad and too nar-
row."2 The results under Tozer would be too broad, according to
the Court, because the defense would cover injuries caused by
equipment purchased from stock if the test were whether the plain-
tiff could sue the government under Feres. The Court stated that
the results would also be too narrow, however, because the Feres
doctrine covers injuries to military personnel only and not injuries
to civilians.'"
Having rejected the Feres doctrine, the Boyle Court turned to
the Federal Tort Claims Act for guidance."' The Court noted that
section 1346(b) of the Act exempts from the government's consent
to be sued any complaints based on acts or omissions committed by
government agencies or employees in the exercise of a discretionary
function.'" The Court reasoned that the selection of designs for
military equipment was a discretionary function, and therefore
needed to be protected.'" Permitting tort suits against contractors,
reasoned the Court, would result in judgments being passed on to
the United States)" This, the Court stated, could interfere with the
exercise of the military's discretion in choosing equipment.'"
Adopting the other elements of the Fourth Circuit's defense,
the Boyle Court ruled that a plaintiff may not impose liability on a
contractor if the government approved reasonably precise equip-
ment specifications, if the equipment conformed to those specifi-
cations, and if the supplier warned the United States about dangers
in the design that were known to the supplier but not to the gov-
l92
" 3 Id. As an example of a suit civilians could bring if the Court adopted the Feres test,
the Boyle Court suggested a suit against the manufacturer of jet fighters for harm caused by
high levels of noise. Id. This, stated the Court, would result in slate law regulation of the
type of jet engines ordered by the military.
134 Id.
1S5 Id. SectiOn 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act states that the consent to suit shall
not apply to:
[alny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising clue care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statutue or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
136 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517.
" 7 Id. at 2518.
138 See ed.
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ernment.' 39 The Court stated that the requirement of government
approval of specifications and equipment conformance to those
specifications was necessary to ascertain whether the situation was
one in which the government's discretionary function to procure
equipment was in danger of frustration. For example, observed the
Court, a procurement officer who orders a piece of equipment from
stock does not have a significant interest in the defective feature."°
The requirement that manufacturers inform the government of
known design dangers, the Court reasoned, would encourage con-
tractors to disclose such design defects and allow the government
to make an informed decision whether to procure the equipment.
In adopting the criteria set forth by the Fourth Circuit, the
Boyle Court expressly rejected criteria suggested by the Eleventh
Circuit in a similar case."' The Boyle Court noted that in the 1985
case of Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp. the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a contractor would not
be liable for design defects if that contractor did not participate, or
participated only minimally, in designing defective equipment or if
the government told the contractor to proceed after the contractor
warned the government of the design's dangers. 142 The criteria
established by the Eleventh Circuit, reasoned the Boyle Court, would
not advance the protection of the government's discretionary func-
tions, because the government might make a policy decision to
proceed with a design regardless of whether the government or the
contractor originated the design. 143
The Court remanded Boyle to the Fourth Circuit for clarifica-
tion of its earlier ruling.'" The Court instructed the Fourth Circuit
to enter judgment in favor of Sikorsky if the court held that no
reasonable jury could find that the defendant had not met the
elements of the defense. Alternatively, the Court instructed the
Fourth Circuit to put the question of whether the defendant had
satisfied the elements of the defense to a jury.
in his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's use of
the Federal Tort Claims Act's discretionary-function exception in
139 Id.
14(' Id, at 2516.
1 41 Id. (rejecting Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736,746 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988)).
192 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518 (citing Grumman, 778 F.2d at 745-46).
143
 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
1 44 Id. at 2519.
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support of the defense. 145 The Federal Tort Claims Act had no
direct bearing in the case, argued Justice Brennan, because the
government was not a party to the suit.' 46 He also argued that, even
if contractors were liable, the government would still be able to
obtain equipment of a specific design.' 47 The dissent suggested that
the majority actually feared that the government would not be able
to get the equipment it wanted at the price it wanted to pay. The
dissent reasoned that this concern did not warrant extension of
immunity to contractors.
Justice Brennan foresaw many dangers in the newly-created
defense because of its "breathtakingly sweeping" scope.' 48 The de-
fense, observed Justice Brennan, would be available not only to
military equipment manufacturers, but also to manufacturers of
almost anything the federal government purchases after reviewing
its design, including everything from "NASA's Challenger space'
shuttle to the Postal Service's old mail cars." 149 Justice Brennan also
feared that government approval of specifications might consist of
little more than a rubber stamping of the manufacturer's plans.' 5"
In addition, the dissent suggested that contractors might use
the defense against civilians as well as against military personnel
and government employees.'m Justice Brennan hypothetically asked
what would have happened had the helicopter crashed on Virginia
beach instead of in the water. The dissent reasoned that in such a
case the manufacturer could have raised the defense against chil-
dren who had been injured while playing on the beach, just as
Sikorsky raised the defense against David Boyle's father.
Moreover, contended the dissent, the defense would apply even
where there was no evidence that the government intentionally
"sacrificed safety" for some other feature, such as speed, agility, or
efficiency.' 52 Nor would it matter whether the piece of equipment
was something most people would not consider dangerous, ob-
served Justice Brennan. Thus, he reasoned, if a contractor designed
a building and a wall collapsed due to poor design, the contractor
145 Id. at 2525 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 2526 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 .0
 Id.
n Id. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152 Id.
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could raise the defense if the government had approved the de-
sign.'" According to Justice Brennan, the defense would be suc-
cessful no matter how blatant the defect was or how easily the
contractor might have remedied it.
Justice Brennan referred to the fact that the third element of
the defense requires that the manufacturer warn the government
about dangers of which the manufacturer is aware but the govern-
ment is not.' 54 This standard requires courts to examine whether
the manufacturer had actual knowledge — not whether the man-
ufacturer knew or should' have known of the danger.'" Thus, ar-
gued Justice Brennan, the manufacturer would avoid liability even
where it negligently failed to discover a defect, as long as the spec-
ifications — no matter how dangerous — were reasonably precise.
C. Post-Boyle Developments
Since Boyle, some federal courts have announced decisions that
further elaborate on the Boyle standard. Despite Justice Brennan's
prediction in the Boyle dissent that the government contractor de-
fense would result in denial of recovery to those injured in non-
military accidents, courts have not thus far extended the defense to
nonmilitary situations. Courts have, however, extended the defense
to include application in failure to warn claims. In addition, some
federal court cases have shed additional light on the meaning of
"approval" under the defense.
In 1988, the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii declined to apply the contractor defense in a nonmilitary
context in In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases.' 56 The court in that
case held that the government contractor defense is unavailable
where there is no conflict between the defendant's contractual duty
to the government and its state law duty to warn. Plaintiffs based
their claim upon the failure of asbestos insulation manufacturers to
warn them of the dangers asbestos exposure presents.' 57 The court
noted that government specifications in this situation neither re-
quire nor forbid any particular warnings. Thus, the asbestos man-
ufacturers could have complied with their state tort law duty to
1 " Id.
154 See id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"5 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156 715 F. Supp. 298 (0. Haw. 1988).
157 Id. at 299-300.
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warn without being in conflict with their contractual duty to the
government.' 58 The government contractor defense was also un-
available to the defendants, reasoned the court, because Boyle ap-
plies only to military equipment and because asbestos insulation
does not qualify as military equipment.' 59 Thus, the combination of
the unexcused failure to warn and the nonmilitary nature of the
asbestos persuaded the court to decline to apply the government
contractor defense.
Courts have also elaborated on other aspects of the Boyle test.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently
addressed the definition of "approval" under Boyle. In the 1989 case
of Smith v. Xerox Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that a weapons simu-
lator manufacturer had satisfied the Boyle standard. In Smith, a
soldier sued for injuries he sustained when an explosive cartridge
in a shoulder-mounted VIPER weapon simulator discharged pre-
maturely.") The soldier alleged that Xerox, the equipment manu-
facturer, negligently designed or manufactured the unit. In addi-
tion, he claimed that Xerox failed to warn him that the weapon
simulator might fire spontaneously when armed despite previous
similar malfunctions. Xerox claimed immunity under the govern-
ment contractor defense.'"'
The Fifth Circuit first considered whether the government had
approved the design for the VIPER simulator. In concluding that
the government did approve the specifications, the Smith court
noted that the government had supplied the environmental speci-
fications that it wanted the VIPER to meet.'" 2 In addition, a Xerox
employee involved in the VIPER'S development testified in an un-
rebutted deposition that the government reviewed and approved
Xerox's final drawings for the VIPER. Although Xerox did not
produce complete specifications for the VIPERS at trial, the court
noted that Xerox did produce a list of the specifications and a
production contract that contained specific references to govern-
150 Id. at 300. The United States District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts
of New York made a similar holding in an asbestos case. In re Joint Eastern and Southern
District Asbestos Ling., 715 F. Sum), 1167, 1168 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Dorse v. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 716 F. Stipp. 580 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
' 59 In re Hawaii, 715 F. Supp. at 300.
'" 866 F,2d 135, 136 (5th Cir. 1089).
101 id,
iaas Id. at 138. The environmental specifications included temperature, humidity, and
salt resistance.
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ment-approved specifications. Thus, the court concluded that Xe-
rox had met its burden of proof on the issue of government ap-
proval of the specifications.' 65
The Smith court next examined whether the VIPER conformed
to the government-approved specifications. The court concluded
that it did, because a Xerox employee testified at his deposition that
government inspectors were present on the assembly line and that
each unit was routinely given a functional test. The plaintiff was
unable to produce contradictory evidence to show that the VIPER
did not conform to specifications. Thus, the Smith court reasoned,
the district court could reasonably have concluded that the second
prong of Boyle was satisfied.'"
Lastly, the court examined the third prong of the Boyle test—
whether the manufacturer warned the government of dangers of
which it was aware but the government was not. The plaintiff ar-
gued that Xerox knew that the VIPER might misfire because it had
modified another system; the CHAPPARAL, to prevent similar ac-
cidents in humid conditions. The plaintiff further argued that,
because Xerox did not tell the government that the VIPER might
misfire, Xerox could not rely on the government contractor de-
fense. 165
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that
the VIPER and the CHAPPARAL were sufficiently different from
one another such that Xerox's knowledge of problems with the
CHAPPARAL could not result in knowledge of problems with the
VIPER being imputed to Xerox.' 66 In addition, the court noted that
reports of previous similar misfirings amounted to unconfirmed
hearsay. Even if similar accidents had occurred, reasoned the Smith
court, the government would have known about them because the
government requires the military to file accident reports. The court
therefore concluded that Xerox could not have possessed infor-
mation that the government did not also have.' 67 Thus, the detailed
163 Id
if'4 Id.
i" Id. at 139.
166 Id. The court noted that the CHAPPARAL was intended to be stored outdoors and
had originally been designed such that it filled with water whenever it rained. When Xerox
learned of misfires with the CHAPPARAL, it redesigned the weapon's housing and changed
the circuit board that fired the weapon so that a larger charge would be required to set it
off. The VIPER, on the other hand, was never supposed to be stored outside. VIPERS were
stored in carrying cases to prevent exposure to the elements.
167 Smith, 866 F.2d at 139.
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factual findings of the district court allowed the Fifth Circuit to
elaborate on the three-prong Boyle test.
On the same day that it decided Smith v. Xerox, the Fifth Circuit
also decided Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp. 168 The Trevino court
held that a corporation that had designed a submarine modification
had not satisfied the three-prong Boyle test. In Trevino, survivors of
five Navy divers killed in a submarine accident brought a products
liability action against the designer of the submarine's diving cham-
ber. On January 16, 1982, the diving chamber's ventilation valve,
which was supposed to allow air into the flooded chamber, did not
open fully. A vacuum formed when the divers drained the chamber,
and they were killed.'"9 General Dynamics asserted the government
contractor defense in response to the plaintiffs' allegations that the
design lacked sufficient safety features such that a diver would know
that the system was drawing a vacuum or such that the system would
automatically prevent this condition. 17"
As it did in Smith v. Xerox, the Fifth Circuit first analyzed
whether the government "approved" the design under the Boyle
standard."' In this case, the Trevino court held that this element
was not satisfied. 12 The court reasoned that although all of the
design drawings for the diving chamber were signed by a govern-
ment employee, mere acceptance of the design without substantive
review is no more than a rubber stamping.'" The court observed
that the Navy had granted a low priority to the design work because
of more important work in progress at the shipyard where the
submarine was being retrofitted. The Navy assigned its less-expe-
rienced engineers and technicians to this project and brought in
"farm-in" personnel to do much of the work, the Trevino court
observed. In addition, the court noted, the Navy's investigation of
the accident revealed that the lack of formal Navy design review
contributed to the problem with the chamber's design. 174 The Navy
had, in the court's view, delegated its discretion to General Dynam-
11" 865 17.2d 1474 (5th Cir. 1989).
169 Id. at 1476.
I'm Divers could not operate the ventilation valve handwheel control from inside the
chamber's bubble. There was no lighted position indicator on the valve control, nor were
there any remote valve position indicators, vacuum gauges, interlocks, or warning devices.
Id. at 1477-78.
171 Id. at 1479.
172 Id. at 1487.
173 See id. at 1480.
174 Id. at 1486-87.
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les.'" The Trevino court stated that the judiciary's function is not to
evaluate the quality of the government's design review. 16
The Trevino court noted that the Navy had reviewed the draw-
ings for compliance with a 339-page circular of requirements. The
court, however, termed this review a "mere review for compliance
with very general performance criteria," and stated that such review
was insufficient to satisfy Boyle.' 77 Thus, the Trevino court concluded,
the district court was correct in holding that General Dynamics had
not satisfied the approval element of the Boyle standard and there-
fore could not shield itself with the government contractor de-
fense.' 78
The Fifth Circuit declined to rehear Trevino.' 79 Circuit Judge
Jolly filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing. Judge
Jolly stated that he believed both that Trevino had rewritten the
Boyle test and that Trevino was at odds with Smith v. Xerox.'"
According to Judge Jolly, the Boyle Court deliberately chose the
word "approve," rather than a stronger synonym, such as "endorse,"
in formulating the first prong of the test. 18 ' He claimed that Trevino
' 75 See id. at 1486.
'T6 Id. The court stated that the proper focus of examination was:
[Mhether the government actually exercised design discretion. If the govern-
ment intended to exercise its discretion over the design of a product and a
government official undertakes to substantially review, evaluate, and then ap-
prove the design, the first element of the Boyle test is satisfied even if the
government official doing the review was incompetent or negligent. The gov-
ernment's use of clearly unqualified individuals to review and approve highly
technical design work, however, may be evidence that the government does not
intend to exercise design discretion but is merely rubber-stamping the contrac-
tor's design specifications ... .
Id. at n.12.
'" Id. at 1476 & n.14.
"8 Id. at 1487. The court found it unnecessary to examine the second prong of Boyle
because the Navy performed the actual construction work without General Dynamics's par-
ticipation. In addition, the court did not need to examine the third Boyle element because a
finding that any of the elements are unsatisfied precludes use of the defense. The court
noted, however, that the third element would not have been satisfied in any event because
both General Dynamics and the Navy could see that the design lacked safety features. Id.
19 876 F.2d 1154, 1155 (5th Cir. 1989).
18° Id. at 1155 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
183 Id. Judge Jolly noted that the Boyle Court might have used several synonyms, as
illustrated by this list:
Approve the most widely applicable, may indicate varying degrees or admi-
ration. Endorse (or indorse), stronger than approve, implies expression of support,
often by public statement. Sanction adds authorization, usually official, to ap-
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had rewritten Boyle because Trevino defined "approved" to mean
"established." 182 Judge Jolly cited passages in Trevino that referred
to "approval" in terms of choosing a design feature, making policy
choices, and substantively reviewing and evaluating a design.'" In
addition, Judge Jolly argued that Trevino did not allow courts to
assume that the government had approved a design by continuing
to use it—"defect and all"--for a thirteen-year period.'"
Agreeing that "approval" and "rubber stamping" were not the
same thing, Judge Jolly argued that the. government's involvement
level in Trevino went beyond rubber stamping. 185 Judge Jolly noted
that the Navy had furnished General Dynamics with 339 pages of
specifications and had assigned a review team to the project. Judge
Jolly would hold that, if the government had considered General
Dynamics's plans and had assented affirmatively to them, the ap-
proval standard was satisfied. Alternatively, he would hold that if
the government had known of the defect but had accepted the
design for a period of years without complaint, then the design was
approved within the meaning of Boyle. The appropriate inquiry
under Boyle's first prong, he suggested, is to examine whether the
allegedly defective feature's characteristics were disclosed with rea-
sonable precision in the design documents that the government
accepted. if so, he would then ask whether a government official
who possessed the duty and authority—and knew that he or she
possessed the duty and authority—to accept or decline the chal-
lenged feature on safety grounds had accepted the design.'"
Judge Jolly also believed that Trevino could not comfortably
coexist with Smith v. Xerox. The court's focus in Smith, he observed,
was different from that in Trevino. In Trevino, the Fifth Circuit
discussed in detail the meaning of the term "approval," Jolly noted.
In Smith, the focal point was the specifications in evidence and
whether they were sufficiently precise such that the government
could have approved them."' Thus, Judge Jolly concluded that if
proval. Certify and accredit imply official endorsement gained upon conforming
to set standards. Ratify refers to making legal by formal official approval.
Id. at 1155 (quoting THE AMY-RICAN HERITAGE DtcrioNAav (Second College Edition 1982)).
' 62 See Trevino, 876 F.2d at 1155 ( jolly, J., dissenting) (citing Trevino v. General Dynamics
Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1479 (5th Cir. 1989)).
183 Id. ( Jolly, J., dissenting) (citing Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1479, 1480, 1484, and 1487,
n.12)).
164 Id. at 1155 ( Jolly, J., dissenting).
'H5 Id. at 1156 ( Jolly, J., dissenting).
' 66 /d.
'" See id. at 1156 (,lolly, j„ dissenting).
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Smith had followed Trevino, Smith's outcome would have been dif-
ferent because there was little evidence in Smith concerning the
extent of the government's review.' 88
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also
addressed the meaning of "approval" under Boyle in 1989. In Ramey
v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., the Fourth Circuit held that a govern-
ment contractor was entitled to immunity under Boyle. In Ramey, an
aircraft mechanic sued the manufacturer of a military jet's ejection
seat for injuries he sustained when the seat's explosive discharged
while the mechanic attempted to remove the seat.'" In holding that
the defendant was entitled to the government contractor defense's
protection, the court noted that there were two methods by which
the defendant could satisfy the approval standard.' 9" The Ramey
court noted that the "length and breadth" of the government's
experience with the equipment, coupled with the government's de-
cision to continue using it, would be enough to constitute approval.
Alternatively, the defense is available where approval is more than
a rubber stamping. The military's participation in the design process
was more than rubber stamping, the court reasoned, because the
military had issued original specifications for the seat, had inspected
and tested the seat's components, and had examined a mock-up of
the seat. 191
The plaintiff in Ramey did not allege that the ejection seat did
not conform to specifications. Thus, the Ramey court concluded that
it did not need to examine whether the defendant had satisfied the
second Boyle prong. Also, the court noted that because the military
possessed full knowledge of the dangers to mechanics of removing
the ejection seat, the third and final prong of the Boyle test had been
met. Thus, the Ramey court concluded, the government contractor
defense shielded Martin-Baker from liability for Ramey's injuries. 192
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
recently has shed some light on the Boyle standard. The Eleventh
Circuit held in the 1989 case of Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp.
that a military aircraft's manufacturer was shielded from liability
under Boyle."3 In Harduvel, an Air Force Captain's widow sued the
manufacturer of the F-16 fighter jet in which her husband was
"8 Id. Both cases were deckled on the same clay, so neither was precedent for the other.
189 874 F,2d 946, 947 (4th Cir. 1989).
' 9" Id. at 950.
' 9 ' Id.
I 2 Id. at 951.
193 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989).
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killed. On November 15, 1982, Captain Harduvel's plane crashed
into the back of a mountain ridge in South Korea. Expert witnesses
testifying on General Dynamics's behalf theorized that Captain Har-
duvel had been suffering severe side effects from taking an anti-
biotic, and that nausea and discomfort caused him to lose control
of his aircraft. Plaintiff's experts blamed the crash on a massive
electrical failure in the F-16 that caused the flight instruments to
malfunction. This malfunction caused Captain Harduvel to become
disoriented in the clouds because he could not ascertain the position
of his wings or the direction in which his jet's nose was pointed.
The electrical failure's cause, hypothesized the plaintiff's experts,
was chafing of the plane's wires—rubbing of the wires against each
other and against the structural members of the aircraft."
At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $3.1 million, specifically
finding that General Dynamics negligently designed and manufac-
tured the F-16. In addition, the jury found that the government
contractor defense, as it existed before Boyle, was unavailable to
General Dynamics: 98 The primary question before the Eleventh
Circuit on review was Boyle's effect on the trial court's decision: 66
In holding that General Dynamics was immune from suit under
Boyle, the Eleventh Circuit first addressed the plaintiff's argument
that a finding of negligent manufacture under state law precluded
application of the government contractor defense. The Harduvel
court reasoned that, because the government contractor defense
was a federal common law creation, determination of whether a
defect should be characterized as.a design or a manufacturing flaw
was also a matter of federal common law. 191 The court characterized
Mrs. Harduvel's claim as one of defective design, stating that if a
defect is something that is inherent in a product or system that the
government has approved, the defense will apply.' 98
 The plaintiff,
the court noted, had offered into evidence a training videotape that
General Dynamics had produced to instruct Air Force personnel
about the dangers of wire chafing. The court viewed this tape as
indicating that wire chafing problems are inherent in the F-I6's
design.
Having determined that Mrs. Harduvel's claim involved alle-
gations of design defects, the court applied the Boyle test. The
19-1 Id. at 1314.
' 95
 Id. at 1315.
m, Id, at 1316.
197 Id. at 1317.
198 Id.
366	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:337
Harduvel court held that the F-16's design process satisfied Boyle's
first prong because the design resulted from "a continuous back
and forth" between General Dynamics and the Air Force. 199 The
court noted that the Air Force had conducted an extensive review
of the design, examining specifications, drawings, and blueprints.
In addition, the Air Force assigned a group of engineers specifically
to review the electrical system. 2°"
The Harduvel court noted an absence of evidence of manufac-
turing defects. Thus, the court concluded, the defendant satisfied
Boyle's second requirement that the equipment conform to specifi-
cations as a matter of law. The defendant had also satisfied the third
prong of Boyle, concluded the Harduvel court, because much of what
General Dynamics knew about wire chafing came from Air Force
reports. Thus, General Dynamics was not aware of dangers of which
the government was not also aware.
As the post-Boyle cases indicate, rubber stamping of a manu-
facturer's design will be insufficient to satisfy Boyle. According to
Trevino, mere "signing off" by a government employee constitutes
rubber stamping. According to Smith, however, a court may say that
the government approved a design where the manufacturer cannot
produce final engineering drawings at trial. In the Harduvel court's
view, formal approval procedures are less important to the Boyle
standard than is the existence of a "continuous back and forth"
between the contractor and the government.
In Boyle, the Supreme Court recognized government contractor
immunity and expanded the realm of uniquely federal interests to
include "getting the government's work done." The Court possessed
the power to fashion federal common law in the case, for reasons
in addition to those it stated in Boyle. Whether the Court should
have exercised the power is a question open for debate. Regardless
of what the Coda should or should not have clone, Boyle will have
implications for the future.
III. THE BOYLE COURT'S POWER TO FASHION FEDERAL COMMON
LAW, ITS LACK OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT, AND BOYLE'S IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE
The government's interest in "getting its work done" does not
fall comfortably within any of the areas of uniquely federal interest
19, Id. at 1320.
2D, Id.
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that the Supreme Court traditionally has recognized. 20 ' Rather, the
government's interest in getting its work done borders on two tra-
ditionally recognized uniquely federal interests—the United States'
rights and duties under its contracts and federal officials' liability
for actions taken in the course of duty. 202 Justice Brennan criticized
the majority's synthesis of a new uniquely federal interest from these
two recognized interests. 203 As Justice Brennan noted, because Boyle
involved a suit between private parties, the two federal interests
relied upon by the majority were inapplicable. Justice Brennan's
criticism is valid. Still, the majority might have set forth some other
basis in precedent for its authority to fashion common law.
The Boyle Court, without citing the case, employed reasoning
similar to that used in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit In-
surance Corp. 204 I n D'Oench, the Court justified creating federal com-
mon law by seizing upon a policy consideration embodied in a
statute that did not actually apply to the facts of the case. 20' The
inapplicable statute in D'Oench was the Federal Reserve Act, which
evinced Congress's policy to protect the FOIC. 2 "" Similarly, the Boyle
Court used the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act207 to support the creation of federal common law even
though that statute did not apply because the government was not
being sued. 2"8
 The Boyle Court might have reasoned that the dis-
cretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act evi-
denced Congress's intention to protect all exercises of the govern-
ment's discretion, including the power to procure equipment. The
Court could have argued that, by creating the government. contrac-
tor defense, it was simply promoting Congress's stated policy of
protecting government officials' discretionary actions.
This line of reasoning is not flawless, however. As Justice Bren-
nan stressed in the Boyle dissent, the government would still be able
5°' See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent's
observations on the incompatibility between the newly recognized federal interest in getting
the government's work done and the traditional areas of federal interest upon which the
majority claimed Boyle impinged.
"2 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
"5 Id. at 2521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'" See id. at 2517. See .supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of
D'Oench.
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,459 (1952).
"6 Id. at 456-57.
"7
 See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Boyle Court's
reference to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
"8
 108 S. Ct, at 2517-18.
368	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:337
to procure the equipment it desired if courts imposed design defect
liability on government contractors — the price may just be some-
what higher for dangerous products than for those safely de-
signed. 209
 Thus, contractor liability would not totally frustrate Con-
gress's policy of protecting the government's discretionary
functions. Still, the Boyle Court might have used this reasoning to
avoid combining two recognized, but inapplicable, federal interests
to support the creation of federal common law.
Alternatively, the Boyle Court could have stressed the argument,
used in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, that courts must apply a
uniform rule where the United States' contractual rights and duties
are involved. 210 In Clearfield, the Court reasoned that the application
of state law could result in identical commercial transactions being
subject to different rules depending upon the state in which the
transaction occurred. Because the federal government must issue
commercial paper nationwide and cannot avoid doing so in states
that have laws unfavorable to its interests, courts must apply a
uniform rule. The Boyle Court might similarly have reasoned that
the government has no control over the occurrence of accidents
involving government equipment and cannot avoid using govern-
ment equipment in states imposing contractor liability. Thus, the
Court might have concluded, courts should apply a uniform rule
in contractor liability cases to insure that all government contracts
are subject to the same conditions.
The Boyle Court might have encountered opposition to such
reasoning, however. State tort law schemes may already impose
uniform conditions on government contracts. If courts were to
apply state law, government equipment manufacturers would as-
sume that the government might use the equipment in a state that
imposes contractor liability. Contractors therefore would factor po-
tential liability costs into all government contracts. Thus, the state
tort law scheme imposes the same result as would a uniform rule
imposing contractor liability.
The Boyle Court might also have supported creation of the
contractor defense by relying upon the recognized federal inter est
of the government's relationships with armed forces personnel, an
interest recognized in United States v. Standard Oil of California.2 "
209 Id. at 2526 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21° Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,367 (1943). See supra notes 33-
43 and accompanying text for a discussion of Clearfield.
4 'i United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301,305-06 (1947). See supra
notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Standard Oil.
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David Boyle was a member of the United States military. The Boyle
Court, like the Standard Oil Court, could have reasoned that federal
law should govern all suits involving injuries that members of the
military sustained in the course of military service. 212 The Boyle
Court probably did not do so because it did not want to limit the
defense only to cases in which armed forces personnel were in-
jured.2 n
Assuming that the Boyle Court possessed the authority to fash-
ion federal common law, the Court nevertheless should have de-
ferred to Congress for the rule of decision. Just as the courts are
ill-equipped to second-guess the substantive decisions of the exec-
utive and legislative branches in military matters, 2 " the courts are
also ill-equipped to make fiscal policy in the area. In Standard Oil,
the government argued that state tort law passed liability through
to the United States in the form of lost services and added medical
care expenses. 2 " Similarly, the Boyle Court believed that tort liability
was being passed through to the United States in the form of higher
contract prices. 216
 In Standard Oil, the Court elected to defer the
creation of indemnity to Congress, reasoning that the legislature
would act if necessary to protect the government's fiscal interests."'
The Boyle Court should have followed the Standard Oil lead by
allowing Congress to determine whether to create the government
contractor defense. Instead, the Boyle Court yielded to executive
branch and defense industry pressurem and usurped Congress's
prerogative to control government fiscal policy.
Alternatively, the Boyle Court should have accepted Justice
Brennan's suggestion that the imposition of contractor liability does
not harm the government's discretionary functions. 219 If govern-
ment contractors are liable for design defects, then the government
could still obtain dangerously designed equipment by paying the
contractor a premium. 22° Thus, the government would be able to
exercise freely its discretion to obtain desired equipment.
212 Cr Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 305-06.
21' See Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517.
2 " Tower V. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403,405 (4th Cir. 1986).
215 See supra note 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government's claim
that state tort law passed liability through to the United States.
216 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
217 Standard Oil, 332 U ,S. at 314-16.
21 " See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of contentions made
in an amictis curiae brief on behalf of petitioner that defense industry pressure inllucnced
the government's position in the case.
212 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2526 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
220 Id.
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Regardless of whether the Supreme Court should have recog;
nized the government contractor defense, or what reasoning it
should have used to justify its actions, Boyle is law. Unless Congress
acts to nullify Boyle's effect or to legislate its limits, the government
contractor defense will continue to evolve judicially. Some post-Boyle
decisions have already been announced, but none has created any
sweeping changes in the Boyle standard.
The Boyle Court has established three requirements for the
government contractor defense's application. If the government
approves reasonably precise specifications for equipment, the equip-
ment conforms to those specifications, and the manufacturer warns
the government of dangers of which the manufacturer is aware,
the manufacturer may avoid liability by asserting the defense. 22 ' In
future cases, however, courts will have to answer several questions
that remain in the wake of Boyle.
Boyle raised the obvious question of what constitutes "govern-
ment approval." The Court stated that the defense will not be
available to manufacturers of goods purchased from stock, because
the government lacks a significant interest in the particular feature
that turns out to be defective. 222
 One can imagine, however, a sit-
uation in which a government procurement officer examines a stock
item and chooses it specifically because of a particular feature. Thus,
suppose a government officer purchases a certain type of pen from
stock because the catalog description claims that it has a particularly
sharp point and is good for pressing through multiple layers of
carbon. Because most government work involves the use of dupli-
cate forms, the officer has a significant interest in the sharpness of
the pen. Suppose that the procurement officer obtains a sample
pen or relies on the catalog description in placing the order. Further
suppose that, because the pen's point is extremely sharp, one of the
pens injures someone. In such a case, the government contractor
defense might apply. Although not a specific element of the defense,
the Boyle Court reasoned that the government official ought to have
some significant interest in the design feature that turns out to be
dangerous in order for the manufacturer to assert the defense. 223
In this hypothetical situation, the procurement officer is interested
in the pen's sharpness. Courts might deem such interest in one of
the pen's features "approval" of the specific design. In addition, the
221
 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
222 See id. at 2516.
22] See id.
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pen's manufacturer would have little difficulty proving that the pen
conforms to the design. Thus, two of the defense's three elements
would be satisfied. The third element would be satisfied easily also,
because, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the standard
necessary for the third element is the contractor's actual knowledge
of design dangers. 224 Therefore, if the manufacturer could show
that it did not know that the pens were dangerously sharp, the
manufacturer could escape liability.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan expressed concern that govern-
ment approval might constitute simply a rubber stamping of what-
ever design a manufacturer submits. 225
 Post-Boyle cases that have
addressed the issue have stated affirmatively that a rubber-stamp
review is insufficient. 226 The question -
 remains, however, as to ex-
actly what level of review is required to elevate the government's
involvement beyond a mere rubber stamp.
In Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the government's involvement was insufficient where the Navy
assigned inexperienced engineers and technicians to a low-priority
job.227
 A mere "signing off" on the final design drawings by gov-
ernment workers constituted rubber-stamping. On the other hand,
the absence of a government employee's signature on design draw-
ings will not necessarily mean that the design was not approved.
Indeed, the defendant in Smith v. Xerox Corp. was unable to produce
the final design drawings for the weapons simulator that it. manu-
factured. More important than the presence or absence of official
signatures is the actual level of involvement by government person-
nel. In Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., the Eleventh Circuit held
that the government's design review satisfied Boyle where there was
a "continuous hack and forth" between General Dynamics and the
Air Force. 228
Although these cases do little to clarify Boyle, prudent contrac-
tors can learn some small lessons from Trevino and Harduvel. Con-
, tractors can strive to set up the "back and forth" of which the
Harduvel court spoke by insisting upon frequent meetings with gov-
ernment officials. They can and should demand that high-ranking
and experienced engineers review designs to avoid the result
229
	 id. at 2519 .(Bren Ilan, J., dissenting).
225 M.
221' See, e.g., Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2c1 916,947 (4th Cir. 1989).
"7 865 F.2d 1474,1486-87 (5th Cir. 1989).
878 F.2d 1311,1320 (11th Cir. 1989).
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reached in Trevino. They can and should document every conver-
sation with government officials by sending confirming letters and
memoranda. In short, prudent contractors should be in constant
contact with the government. Although it is unlikely after Trevino
that a minor bureaucrat could approve the design of sophisticated,
expensive equipment for purposes of the Boyle test, personnel at
low levels could approve other military procurements. In addition,
Boyle does not provide any assurances to the public that the decision-
maker possesses the technical competence to evaluate the design in
question. Indeed, after Trevino, contractors may use the government
contractor defense even where the government official reviewing
the design was incompetent or negligent. 229
Another aspect of the government contractor defense that will
require clarification is the meaning of the word "specification."
Courts may conclude that the term refers only to manufacturing
specifications, which contain specifics such as desired construction
materials and manufacturing tolerances. Alternatively, courts may
include in the definition performance specifications that describe
the desired capabilities of the equipment, such as speed or •agility.
Courts that follow Trevino will probably conclude that very general
performance criteria do not qualify as reasonably precise specifi-
cations.
In addition, it is unclear whether approval of "specifications"
will include approval of a sample of fungible goods or a catalog
description of a simple item. In the case of sophisticated equipment,
approval of a model or prototype may constitute approval of the
specifications. The Fourth Circuit, in Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft,
considered the military's examination of an ejection seat mock-up
to be part of the approval process. Future cases will have to address
more completely the question of what constitutes reasonably precise
specifications.
IV. CONCLUSION
In recognizing the government contractor defense, the Boyle
Court added the government's interest in getting its work done to
the limited number of uniquely federal interests that, when impli-
cated in a controversy, justify courts' application of federal common
law. The Boyle Court based its authority to fashion federal common
law on the theory that the controversy bordered on two uniquely
federal interests that the Supreme Court had recognized in earlier
227 865 F.2d at 1986-87, n.12.
• March 19901	 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE 	 373
decisions — the United States' contractual rights and government
officials' immunity. The Boyle dissent criticized this line of reasoning,
because the controversy did not implicate directly either previously
recognized interest upon which the majority relied. Even if the
Court's reasoning was flawed, as the dissent suggested, the majority
could have based its common lawmaking authority on other theo-
ries. The Court might have reasoned that in recognizing the defense
it was enforcing Congress's policy of protecting the government's
discretionary functions. The Boyle Court might also have stressed
the necessity for a uniform rule in controversies that implicate the
United States' relationship with armed forces personnel or its con-
tractual obligations.
Regardless of the theory upon which the Court justified its
common-lawmaking ability, the Court erred in recognizing the de-
fense. The Court should have relegated creation of such a novel
defense to Congress. Congress, with its committees and advisors, is
better able to determine whether the defense is necessary and what
form it should take.
In creating the defense, the Boyle Court opened a Pandora's
box, because the Court has, in effect, extended the immunity to
anyone helping to get the government's work done. Future cases
will, of course, define the defense's parameters more precisely.
Courts must further clarify the terms "specifications" and "govern-
ment approval." Courts will also confront situations in which man-
ufacturers raise the defense in civilian injury cases and in situations
involving nonmilitary equipment. Manufacturers will probably be
allowed to assert the defense successfully where the plaintiff can
otherwise receive compensation through a federal scheme. For ex-
ample, Congress has provided compensation for government work-
ers injured in the course of duty. Courts may be reluctant, however,
to allow a contractor to claim the defense where a suit against the
contractor offers the plaintiff his or her only hope for recovery. In
any event, Congress should not wait for the courts to extend the
defense further, but should immediately limit it through legislation
or abolish it entirely. Our legal system should not deny an innocent
plaintiff recovery simply because the government approved the
design of the object that caused the plaintiff's injury.
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